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US President Donald Trump’s decision to abruptly cancel a previously confirmed visit by his envoys to Islamabad underscores a defining feature of the current crisis: diplomacy that advances and retreats at the speed of presidential messaging.

Until this latest move, Washington had been sending mixed but cautiously constructive signals. Backchannel contacts and Pakistan’s mediation had raised the possibility of direct engagement in Islamabad, potentially involving Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Mr Trump’s decision to cancel the trip does not formally end the diplomatic track, but it significantly alters its momentum. Instead of actively pursuing negotiations, the burden now shifts to Tehran, effectively placing the onus on Iran to initiate contact on US terms.

US president’s decision to cancel envoys’ trip does not formally end diplomatic track, but it significantly alters its momentum

For mediators like Pakistan, this is a notable setback. Diplomacy thrives on continuity; abrupt reversals complicate both timing and trust.

‘Erratic and provocative’

Iranian officials have long argued that Mr Trump’s public messaging disrupts diplomacy, a concern reflected in Western media coverage.

The Guardian has described Mr Trump’s “erratic and provocative commentary” as “a major obstacle” to diplomacy, noting that such statements can undermine ongoing engagement. The publication has also warned of a broader “lack of a clear exit strategy”, highlighting uncertainty in US policy direction.

The New York Times has frequently noted that President Trump uses social media as an instrument of policymaking, often announcing or shaping decisions in real time.

The Washington Post has reported that his messaging has at times complicated or contradicted official diplomatic positions, while the BBC has highlighted how such statements can move markets and influence global diplomacy.

Analysts across the Western world have pointed to the growing role of presidential messaging in shaping events in real time, where public statements can advance, complicate, or abruptly halt diplomatic efforts. In this conflict, communication is not commentary. It is action.

Mr Trump’s approach has followed a recurring pattern: escalation, pause, outreach, and sudden withdrawal.

The conflict began with what analysts described as a “shock-and-awe” phase, followed by a shift towards economic pressure and conditional diplomacy. Yet even within short timeframes, the president has moved between optimism and coercion, welcoming diplomatic openings while maintaining military pressure.

The cancellation of the Islamabad trip now reinforces this cycle.

The impact extends beyond diplomacy. Energy markets, highly sensitive to geopolitical signals, have reacted sharply throughout the crisis. Oil prices have surged, rising more than 50 per cent since the conflict began, and remain volatile amid mixed signals about war and peace.

More recently, renewed uncertainty following the cancellation of talks is likely to reinforce market instability, as traders respond not only to developments on the ground but also to shifts in tone.

Across Europe, unease is also expected to deepen. Allies already grappling with disruptions linked to tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have expressed concern about the absence of a predictable US strategy.

Islamabad talks on hold, not over

Despite the setback, diplomacy is not dead. Pakistan’s effort to convene talks remains relevant, and both Washington and Tehran retain incentives to avoid a prolonged conflict. However, the dynamics have shifted.

Any future engagement is now more likely to depend on whether Iran chooses to initiate contact — and whether Washington maintains a consistent position long enough to sustain negotiations.

The core issues remain unchanged: US demands for verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear programme, and Iran’s insistence on sanctions relief and an end to military pressure. Mr Trump’s assertion that “we have all the cards” reflects Washington’s attempt to frame the situation as leverage-driven diplomacy.

Tehran, however, is likely to interpret the cancellation differently — as inconsistency or even hesitation.

Both sides are shaping narratives for domestic and international audiences. In that contest, Mr Trump’s communication style remains both a tool and a risk: it enables rapid pressure, but complicates the credibility of long-term commitments.

What lies ahead

The immediate future is more uncertain than it was just days ago.

The Islamabad talks, once appearing within reach, are now effectively on hold. Whether they are revived will depend on Tehran’s response — and whether Washington sustains a coherent approach.

A narrow path to de-escalation still exists: a limited agreement offering phased concessions on both sides. But that path now appears more fragile.

For now, the conflict remains suspended — between diplomacy and escalation — shaped as much by sudden statements as by deliberate strategy.

Published in Dawn, April 26th, 2026

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US President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump were rushed out of the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner by Secret Service agents on Saturday night after a man armed with a shotgun tried to breach security, officials said.

A man armed with a shotgun fired at a Secret Service agent, an FBI official told Reuters. The agent was hit in an area covered by protective gear and not harmed, the official said.

All federal officials, including Trump, were safe. About an hour after Trump was rushed from the event, he posted on Truth Social that a “shooter had been apprehended.” “Quite an evening in DC, Secret Service and Law Enforcement did a fantastic job,” Trump added.

Shortly afterwards, he posted, “The First Lady, plus the Vice President, and all Cabinet members, are in perfect condition.” He said he would be holding a White House press conference on Saturday night.

Anthony Guglielmi, a Secret Service spokesman, said the service was investigating a shooting near the main screening area at the entrance to the event.

After the sound of shots, dinner attendees immediately stopped talking, and people started screaming Get down, get down!” Hundreds of guests dove under the tables as Secret Service officers in combat gear ran into the dining room. Trump and the first lady had bent down behind the dais before being hustled out by Secret Service officers.

Many of the 2,600 attendees took cover while waiters fled to the front of the dining hall.

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Hours after an Iranian delegation departed Islamabad, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Saturday spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and said that Pakistan was committed to serving as an “honest and sincere facilitator”.

In a post on the social media platform X, PM Shehbaz said that he had a “warm and constructive” call with the Iranian president on the evolving regional situation.

“I appreciated Iran’s continued engagement, including the high-level delegation to Islamabad led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, whom I had the pleasure of meeting earlier today,” he said.

“I reaffirmed that, with the support of friends and partners, Pakistan remains committed to [serving] as an honest and sincere facilitator — working tirelessly to advance durable peace and lasting stability in the region,” he said.

According to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the phone call lasted 50 minutes, with the two leaders exchanging views on the “current regional situation and ongoing efforts to promote peace and stability in the region”.

It said that PM Shehbaz appreciated the participation of the high-level Iranian delegation in the Islamabad Talks held on April 11 and 12.

Further, the prime minister also welcomed Iran’s decision to send a delegation led by FM Araghchi to Islamabad.

“While sharing with the Iranian president an overview of his recent diplomatic outreach to a number of world leaders, the prime minister emphasised that these interactions had been helpful in building broader consensus in support of sustained dialogue and diplomacy aimed at achieving lasting peace in the war-affected region,” the PMO said.

It further said that the prime minister expressed appreciation for the fruitful discussions by the Iranian leadership with Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Munir during his recent visit to Tehran.

“While reassuring the Iranian president of Pakistan’s firm commitment to regional peace, the prime minister said that Pakistan would continue its sincere and honest endeavours to promote regional peace and security,” the statement said.

It added that Pezeshkian thanked the prime minister, CDF Munir and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar for their “significant contribution to the peace efforts”.

“While expressing Iran’s desire for peace, he also expressed confidence that the fraternal ties between Iran and Pakistan will continue to strengthen and expand in the future,” the statement said.

It added that the prime minister also conveyed his greetings and regards to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei.

“Both leaders agreed to continue their close coordination,” the statement concluded.

The first round of direct talks between the US and Iran was held in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, which ended after more than 20 hours without agreement but kept the diplomatic channel open.

Since then, exchanges have continued indirectly through Pakistan, with both sides calibrating positions while avoiding a formal breakdown.

The ceasefire, originally brokered around April 7 and 8, has been extended without a defined timeline, creating space for diplomacy but also prolonging uncertainty.

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OVER most of the past year, Pakistan’s role in US-Iran diplomacy rema­ined quiet, familiar and carefully limited; functioning as a channel passing messages and keeping lines of open when direct contact between two global adversaries was politically difficult.

For the larger part, Islamabad was not setting the agenda, only facilitating communication. That changed at the end of February, when the outbreak of all-out war altered ground realities.

What started as discreet facilitation quickly levelled up into something more ambitious, with Pakistan hosting delegations and publicly positioning itself as a bridge between Washington and Tehran.

On March 24, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Pakistan would “facilitate” dialogue, a formulation that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar echoed a week later at the end of a quadrilateral meeting, when he said Pakistan would “host and facilitate meaningful talks”.

From the UN chief to the Kremlin, Islamabad’s efforts to mediate between the US and Iran have won it universal acclaim. Although experts agree Pakistan is best-positioned for this role, lasting outcomes are not reached overnight and require structured engagement

After the first round in Islamabad earlier this month, that description was altered once again, when Dar said on April 12 that he, along with Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, had “helped mediate several rounds of intense and constructive negotiations”.

The change in language was not incidental, rather, it signalled a willingness to place national credibility behind a process whose outcome remains uncertain, at least for the time being.

Why Islamabad?

Part of the explanation for this lies in geography. Pakistan sits next to Iran and within strategic reach of the Gulf, while maintaining longstanding security ties with the US.

But geography alone does not create a mediator. The shift, in fact, reflects a search for enhanced relevance on the external front, with Islamabad seizing the opportunity to act as a major diplomatic player, rather than a security concern. This is especially prescient given the current global context; where influence is increasingly seen as being tied to crisis management, a la the Board of Peace. Additionally, the move to mediation is also about containing the spill-over of conflict into Pakis­tan’s own sphere, whether through economic disruption, regional instability or security pressures.

There is also a sense among diplomatic practitioners that Pakistan’s past experience gives it the impetus to attempt such a role.

“We played [in the past] an important role in the release of US hostages from Iran,” former foreign secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani recalls.

Pakistan “at the highest level played an active and positive role in bringing about a ceasefire (during the 2026 war) and bringing the two conflicting parties to the negotiating table”, he adds, arguing that the present effort had already averted wider economic losses.

He also notes that Pakistan has looked after ‘Iranian interests’ in Wa­­shington for decades — the Pakistan embassy houses Tehran’s consular presence in the American capital — which, in his view, places it in a better position than many others.

That reading is shared by others. Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi recalls that “Pakistan mediated bet­ween Iran and Iraq during Saddam’s time in the 1980s. It didn’t stop the war but the effort was made.”

The former diplomat, who is also executive director of the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) think tank, also cited Pakistan’s role in facilitating contacts between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the context of Yemen, not too long ago. “This history qualified Pakistan to be a mediator.”

The emphasis, however, is on effort rather than outcome.

Others underscore how effective mediation depends less on history and more on credibility in the here and now. Former envoy to UN, US and UK, Maleeha Lodhi, observes that “a decisive factor is the mediator’s neutrality and credibility so that the two parties can have trust in the mediating country”.

That requirement becomes more demanding in an asymmetric conflict, where one side holds significantly greater leverage.

‘Historic baggage’

Experience suggests that mediation works under certain conditions: in the existence of a mutually painful stalemate, a mediator possessing both legitimacy and some degree of leverage, and the process being tightly managed. Where any of these elements are weak, the process tends to drift, and positions of the parties involved in the conflict harden.

The experience of Camp David illustrates this. The US did not simply bring Egypt and Israel together, rather it provided inducements and guarantees that made compromise politically defensible. It must be remembered that agreements have to be sold at home, not just accepted across the table; without that political cover, leaders have little room to manoeuvre.

The same constraint applies to the current US-Iran conflict, where Wa­­shington is seeking tangible progress on maritime access and nuclear limits, while Tehran needs relief from pressure and recognition of its security concerns. Therefore, any framework for dialogue that does not address both sets of requirements will not do.

Process management is equally important. The Dayton Accords of 1995 — which ended the Bosnian War — showed how controlling the environment in terms of limiting external influence and forcing sustained engagement can shape outcomes, while at the same time allowing the mediator to reduce space for backtracking.

But that model is harder to replicate today, when negotiators are able to remain in constant contact with their capitals through far more soph­isticated communications channels.

During the Islamabad talks, there were real-time consultations by the US delegation, which potentially caused positions to shift. The Iranians would have probably loved to do the same, but they were constrained by concerns over the security of their leadership back home.

Striking a balance

Pakistan’s decision to host the talks reflects an awareness that the venue matters. A controlled setting can reduce public posturing and allow space for exploring options, but the limits are also evident.

While Islamabad could host the talks and probably keep the media at bay, it could not fully insulate them from outside influence. This is where the question of leverage becomes central. Pakistan has access to both sides, which few countries do. But access is not the same as influence.

The US retains global options and coercive tools, while Iran is operating under sanctions and sustained pressure. In such conditions, the risk is that mediation begins to reflect the priorities of the stronger side, and that very perception can in itself erode trust.

One should not forget that in Jan­uary 1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Ko­­­sygin hosted the Tashkent talks that ended the 1965 India-Pakistan war, acting as a neutral broker des­pite Moscow’s clear tilt toward India. That agreement focused on withdr­a­wal to pre-war positions and a mutual ceasefire, re­­flecting a priority on regional stability rather than a preference for one side over the other.

Ambassador Masood Khan argues that Pakistan is not constrained by history, saying: “Thankfully, Pakistan does not carry any baggage from its previous mediatory roles”.

He described the current effort as “a new chapter in the history of diplomacy”, noting that Islamabad had built regional and international support for its role. He also pointed to the framework of Article 33 of the UN Charter as the appropriate basis for mediation.

Structure is key

Yet even with wider support, the structure of the process remains critical.

The Oslo experience is a reminder that momentum without a framework is fragile and negotiations that defer core disputes without enforcement mechanisms tend to unravel over time. The US-Iran dispute is not limited to a ceasefire and involves sanctions, nuclear limits, maritime access and regional security arrangements. Therefore, without sequencing, verification and guarantees, any pause in fighting risks being temporary.

Pakistan’s own diplomatic record reflects these limits. It has often played a role in opening channels, rather than shaping final outcomes. Its contribution to the US-China thaw in 1971 was facilitative, while in the Geneva process on Afghanistan, it was a stakeholder. In Doha, it influenced access rather than the terms of agreement.

Interestingly, most of the foreign policy experts Dawn spoke to mentioned these examples as instances of mediation, even though they were not, in the strictest sense of the term.

These precedents, nevertheless, help unravel what is at stake in the current effort. Pakistan is experienced in enabling dialogue, but its prowess when it comes in sustaining a structured negotiation over time may be found wanting.

Despite this, Islamabad has won acclaim for its efforts — everyone from the UN chief to the Kremlin and Beijing, as well as regional heads of state and even the leaders of the two warring sides have only praised Pakistan’s role.

Whether the current effort succeeds will depend on how the process is managed. Careful messaging, balanced engagement, and a framework that would allow both sides equal grounds to defend a compromise at home is essential to lasting deal. Without these, it is feared that even sustained dialogue may not produce durable outcomes.

Published in Dawn, April 25th, 2026

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ISLAMABAD: In a surprise move, the Shehbaz Sharif government on Friday increased the prices of both petrol and diesel by Rs26.77 per litre with immediate effect for the week ending May 1, passing on the impact of global prices during the last fortnight while also seeking to raise revenues in the final months of the fiscal year under commitments with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The IMF’s executive board is expected to approve in the first half of May the disbursement of more than $1.2 billion under two ongoing programmes.

As of April 23, diesel prices were estimated to go down by around Rs25 per litre and petrol by Rs6 per litre. However, the government partially restored the petroleum levy on diesel and increased petrol prices to meet overall fiscal targets.

Unlike the prime minister’s anno­uncements of price cuts, the increase this time was quietly announced by the petroleum division on the day Iran and the United States dispatched their negotiators to Islamabad for the second round of talks.

Petrol, diesel prices raised by Rs27 per litre

As such, the ex-depot price of high-speed diesel (HSD) was fixed at Rs380.19 against Rs353.42 per litre at present, up by 7.6pc or Rs26.77 per litre.

The diesel price has come down from a peak of Rs520.35 on April 10 as the prime minister removed the petroleum levy for two weeks but then allowed partial recovery, sour­ces said. HSD is considered the most inflationary item due to its widesp­read use in freight transportation.

Likewise, the ex-depot rate of petrol was set at Rs393.35 per litre for the coming week, up from Rs366.58 per litre, an increase of Rs26.77 or 7.3pc.

With the latest revision, the government is now charging around Rs135 per litre in taxes on petrol and Rs65 per litre on diesel, including petroleum levy, customs duty and the climate support levy.

On Friday, the government increased the petroleum levy on petrol by about Rs27, raising it from Rs80 to Rs107.38 per litre, while the levy on high-speed diesel was kept at zero at the retail level under the latest notification.

In a written statement, Petro­leum Minister Ali Pervez Malik said oil prices were again rising due to regional tensions and the government had to take measures to pass on the additional burden to consumers in view of agreements with international stakeholders.

He said the government absor­bed the increase in international prices for as long as possible with its limited resources and provided “historic relief” to the people.

Petrol and diesel rates have gone up from Rs266 and Rs281 per litre, respectively, after the US-Israel attacked Iran on Feb 28, sending shockwaves to the global energy markets.

The two fuels remain the government’s key revenue generators, with combined monthly sales of around 700,000 to 800,000 tonnes compared to about 10,000 tonnes for kerosene.

Published in Dawn, April 25th, 2026

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The government raised the prices of petrol and high-speed diesel (HSD) by Rs26.77 on Friday.

Following the increase, the price of petrol now stands at Rs393.35 and that of HSD at Rs380.19.

The announcement was made in a press release issued by the Petroleum Division. It said the prices were revised for the week starting on April 25.

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More to follow

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• In letter to commission, Justice Afridi warns move will set ‘undesirable and potentially far-reaching precedent’
• Fears it will ‘erode public confidence’ in judiciary’s independence and stability
• Last year, he described transfer of three judges to IHC from different provinces under Article 200 as something to be ‘rejoiced’

ISLAMABAD: Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Yahya Afridi has opposed the scheduled meeting of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) being called to consider the transfer of five judges of the Islamabad High Court (IHC) to different high courts of the country.

Although the CJP had earlier declined to call the meeting of the JCP, he eventually scheduled the session after it was requisitioned by a two-thirds majority of the commission’s members, an informed source privy to the development confided.

The commission is scheduled to meet at 1pm on April 28, during which it may consider the contents of the CJP’s letter to the JCP in which he expressed his reservations as well as deliberate upon the transfer of five serving IHC judges to different provincial high courts.

In his letter, the CJP expressed concern that allowing transfers of sitting IHC judges would set an “undesirable and potentially far-reaching precedent, effectively normalising the treatment of judges as administratively interchangeable or disposable”.

Such an approach, the source stated while citing the CJP’s letter, would “carry serious implications for the institutional integrity of the judiciary”, thus “eroding public confidence” in its independence and stability.

Article 200 of the Constitution empowers the JCP to recommend transfers without the consent of the judges concerned. However, the consent of judges was mandatory before the 27th Constitution Amendment. The amended provision has now vested this authority in the JCP, where decisions are taken by majority vote, whether the CJP agrees or not.

It is believed that the judges under consideration for transfer include IHC’s senior puisne judge Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, Justice Babar Sattar, Justice Arbab Muhammad Tahir, Justice Saman Rafat Imtiaz and Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro.

‘Rejoiced’

In one of his interactions with the media on Feb 3, 2025, the CJP had supported the idea of transferring judges to the IHC, even tho­ugh he acknowledged reservations regarding the seniority principle.

At the time, the CJP described the transfer of three judges to the IHC from different provinces under Article 200 as something to be “rejoiced”, setting a precedent that should be followed in the fut­ure. “The IHC is the symbol of four federating units and not merely a white marble building,” the CJP had observed while sharing his reason why he agreed with the proposal to transfer three judges to the high court. He had also read out a summary stating that the transfer of the judges from different federating units was fully “synchronised with the spirit of federalism as enshrined in the Constitution”.

“It is also in conformity with Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court (IHC) Act 2010… [there is] thoughtful consideration behind the proposal, [which] illustrates the resolve and equitable share to the linguistic diversity of our country and [a] fair chance of representation to all the federating units in the high court of the common capital of the federation i.e. [the] IHC,” the summary stated.

“Rejoice the fact that the IHC now has judges who are Balochi-speaking or Sindhi-speaking,” the CJP had emphasised, adding: “Had we had a judge from the tribal area in Peshawar, I would have asked to bring him to the IHC too.”

In his current letter to the JCP, the CJP is said to have stated that the proposed transfer of sitting judges out of the IHC would “in substance assume a punitive character” [and pave the way for] “an outcome that finds no sanction anywhere in the constitutional scheme governing the superior judiciary”.

“Besides, such transfer is entirely alien to the purpose of Article 200 of the Constitution and runs contrary to the foundational principles of judicial independence and security of tenure,” the CJP stated.

The CJP observed, the requisition for convening the JCP meeting for the purpose of transferring the IHC judges “could not be acceded to by the undersigned”. On June 19 last year, the SC’s Constitutional Bench, constituted under the 26th Constitutional Amendment, had, by a 3-2 majority, ruled that the transfer of three judges from provincial high courts to the IHC was in line with the Constitution.

Five IHC judges, the Karachi Bar Association, the IHC Bar Association and others had challenged the transfer of Chief Justice Sardar Mohammad Sarfraz Dogar, Khadim Hussain Soomro and Muhammad Asif from the Lahore, Sindh and Balochistan high courts, respectively, before the SC.

The controversy revolved around the alteration of the IHC judges’ seniority list after these transfers, as Justice Dogar was made the senior puisne judge, paving the way for his appointment as IHC chief justice after Justice Aamer Farooq’s elevation to the SC.

Published in Dawn, April 24th, 2026

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