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OVER most of the past year, Pakistan’s role in US-Iran diplomacy rema­ined quiet, familiar and carefully limited; functioning as a channel passing messages and keeping lines of open when direct contact between two global adversaries was politically difficult.

For the larger part, Islamabad was not setting the agenda, only facilitating communication. That changed at the end of February, when the outbreak of all-out war altered ground realities.

What started as discreet facilitation quickly levelled up into something more ambitious, with Pakistan hosting delegations and publicly positioning itself as a bridge between Washington and Tehran.

On March 24, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Pakistan would “facilitate” dialogue, a formulation that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar echoed a week later at the end of a quadrilateral meeting, when he said Pakistan would “host and facilitate meaningful talks”.

From the UN chief to the Kremlin, Islamabad’s efforts to mediate between the US and Iran have won it universal acclaim. Although experts agree Pakistan is best-positioned for this role, lasting outcomes are not reached overnight and require structured engagement

After the first round in Islamabad earlier this month, that description was altered once again, when Dar said on April 12 that he, along with Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, had “helped mediate several rounds of intense and constructive negotiations”.

The change in language was not incidental, rather, it signalled a willingness to place national credibility behind a process whose outcome remains uncertain, at least for the time being.

Why Islamabad?

Part of the explanation for this lies in geography. Pakistan sits next to Iran and within strategic reach of the Gulf, while maintaining longstanding security ties with the US.

But geography alone does not create a mediator. The shift, in fact, reflects a search for enhanced relevance on the external front, with Islamabad seizing the opportunity to act as a major diplomatic player, rather than a security concern. This is especially prescient given the current global context; where influence is increasingly seen as being tied to crisis management, a la the Board of Peace. Additionally, the move to mediation is also about containing the spill-over of conflict into Pakis­tan’s own sphere, whether through economic disruption, regional instability or security pressures.

There is also a sense among diplomatic practitioners that Pakistan’s past experience gives it the impetus to attempt such a role.

“We played [in the past] an important role in the release of US hostages from Iran,” former foreign secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani recalls.

Pakistan “at the highest level played an active and positive role in bringing about a ceasefire (during the 2026 war) and bringing the two conflicting parties to the negotiating table”, he adds, arguing that the present effort had already averted wider economic losses.

He also notes that Pakistan has looked after ‘Iranian interests’ in Wa­­shington for decades — the Pakistan embassy houses Tehran’s consular presence in the American capital — which, in his view, places it in a better position than many others.

That reading is shared by others. Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi recalls that “Pakistan mediated bet­ween Iran and Iraq during Saddam’s time in the 1980s. It didn’t stop the war but the effort was made.”

The former diplomat, who is also executive director of the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) think tank, also cited Pakistan’s role in facilitating contacts between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the context of Yemen, not too long ago. “This history qualified Pakistan to be a mediator.”

The emphasis, however, is on effort rather than outcome.

Others underscore how effective mediation depends less on history and more on credibility in the here and now. Former envoy to UN, US and UK, Maleeha Lodhi, observes that “a decisive factor is the mediator’s neutrality and credibility so that the two parties can have trust in the mediating country”.

That requirement becomes more demanding in an asymmetric conflict, where one side holds significantly greater leverage.

‘Historic baggage’

Experience suggests that mediation works under certain conditions: in the existence of a mutually painful stalemate, a mediator possessing both legitimacy and some degree of leverage, and the process being tightly managed. Where any of these elements are weak, the process tends to drift, and positions of the parties involved in the conflict harden.

The experience of Camp David illustrates this. The US did not simply bring Egypt and Israel together, rather it provided inducements and guarantees that made compromise politically defensible. It must be remembered that agreements have to be sold at home, not just accepted across the table; without that political cover, leaders have little room to manoeuvre.

The same constraint applies to the current US-Iran conflict, where Wa­­shington is seeking tangible progress on maritime access and nuclear limits, while Tehran needs relief from pressure and recognition of its security concerns. Therefore, any framework for dialogue that does not address both sets of requirements will not do.

Process management is equally important. The Dayton Accords of 1995 — which ended the Bosnian War — showed how controlling the environment in terms of limiting external influence and forcing sustained engagement can shape outcomes, while at the same time allowing the mediator to reduce space for backtracking.

But that model is harder to replicate today, when negotiators are able to remain in constant contact with their capitals through far more soph­isticated communications channels.

During the Islamabad talks, there were real-time consultations by the US delegation, which potentially caused positions to shift. The Iranians would have probably loved to do the same, but they were constrained by concerns over the security of their leadership back home.

Striking a balance

Pakistan’s decision to host the talks reflects an awareness that the venue matters. A controlled setting can reduce public posturing and allow space for exploring options, but the limits are also evident.

While Islamabad could host the talks and probably keep the media at bay, it could not fully insulate them from outside influence. This is where the question of leverage becomes central. Pakistan has access to both sides, which few countries do. But access is not the same as influence.

The US retains global options and coercive tools, while Iran is operating under sanctions and sustained pressure. In such conditions, the risk is that mediation begins to reflect the priorities of the stronger side, and that very perception can in itself erode trust.

One should not forget that in Jan­uary 1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Ko­­­sygin hosted the Tashkent talks that ended the 1965 India-Pakistan war, acting as a neutral broker des­pite Moscow’s clear tilt toward India. That agreement focused on withdr­a­wal to pre-war positions and a mutual ceasefire, re­­flecting a priority on regional stability rather than a preference for one side over the other.

Ambassador Masood Khan argues that Pakistan is not constrained by history, saying: “Thankfully, Pakistan does not carry any baggage from its previous mediatory roles”.

He described the current effort as “a new chapter in the history of diplomacy”, noting that Islamabad had built regional and international support for its role. He also pointed to the framework of Article 33 of the UN Charter as the appropriate basis for mediation.

Structure is key

Yet even with wider support, the structure of the process remains critical.

The Oslo experience is a reminder that momentum without a framework is fragile and negotiations that defer core disputes without enforcement mechanisms tend to unravel over time. The US-Iran dispute is not limited to a ceasefire and involves sanctions, nuclear limits, maritime access and regional security arrangements. Therefore, without sequencing, verification and guarantees, any pause in fighting risks being temporary.

Pakistan’s own diplomatic record reflects these limits. It has often played a role in opening channels, rather than shaping final outcomes. Its contribution to the US-China thaw in 1971 was facilitative, while in the Geneva process on Afghanistan, it was a stakeholder. In Doha, it influenced access rather than the terms of agreement.

Interestingly, most of the foreign policy experts Dawn spoke to mentioned these examples as instances of mediation, even though they were not, in the strictest sense of the term.

These precedents, nevertheless, help unravel what is at stake in the current effort. Pakistan is experienced in enabling dialogue, but its prowess when it comes in sustaining a structured negotiation over time may be found wanting.

Despite this, Islamabad has won acclaim for its efforts — everyone from the UN chief to the Kremlin and Beijing, as well as regional heads of state and even the leaders of the two warring sides have only praised Pakistan’s role.

Whether the current effort succeeds will depend on how the process is managed. Careful messaging, balanced engagement, and a framework that would allow both sides equal grounds to defend a compromise at home is essential to lasting deal. Without these, it is feared that even sustained dialogue may not produce durable outcomes.

Published in Dawn, April 25th, 2026

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ISLAMABAD: In a surprise move, the Shehbaz Sharif government on Friday increased the prices of both petrol and diesel by Rs26.77 per litre with immediate effect for the week ending May 1, passing on the impact of global prices during the last fortnight while also seeking to raise revenues in the final months of the fiscal year under commitments with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The IMF’s executive board is expected to approve in the first half of May the disbursement of more than $1.2 billion under two ongoing programmes.

As of April 23, diesel prices were estimated to go down by around Rs25 per litre and petrol by Rs6 per litre. However, the government partially restored the petroleum levy on diesel and increased petrol prices to meet overall fiscal targets.

Unlike the prime minister’s anno­uncements of price cuts, the increase this time was quietly announced by the petroleum division on the day Iran and the United States dispatched their negotiators to Islamabad for the second round of talks.

Petrol, diesel prices raised by Rs27 per litre

As such, the ex-depot price of high-speed diesel (HSD) was fixed at Rs380.19 against Rs353.42 per litre at present, up by 7.6pc or Rs26.77 per litre.

The diesel price has come down from a peak of Rs520.35 on April 10 as the prime minister removed the petroleum levy for two weeks but then allowed partial recovery, sour­ces said. HSD is considered the most inflationary item due to its widesp­read use in freight transportation.

Likewise, the ex-depot rate of petrol was set at Rs393.35 per litre for the coming week, up from Rs366.58 per litre, an increase of Rs26.77 or 7.3pc.

With the latest revision, the government is now charging around Rs135 per litre in taxes on petrol and Rs65 per litre on diesel, including petroleum levy, customs duty and the climate support levy.

On Friday, the government increased the petroleum levy on petrol by about Rs27, raising it from Rs80 to Rs107.38 per litre, while the levy on high-speed diesel was kept at zero at the retail level under the latest notification.

In a written statement, Petro­leum Minister Ali Pervez Malik said oil prices were again rising due to regional tensions and the government had to take measures to pass on the additional burden to consumers in view of agreements with international stakeholders.

He said the government absor­bed the increase in international prices for as long as possible with its limited resources and provided “historic relief” to the people.

Petrol and diesel rates have gone up from Rs266 and Rs281 per litre, respectively, after the US-Israel attacked Iran on Feb 28, sending shockwaves to the global energy markets.

The two fuels remain the government’s key revenue generators, with combined monthly sales of around 700,000 to 800,000 tonnes compared to about 10,000 tonnes for kerosene.

Published in Dawn, April 25th, 2026

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The government raised the prices of petrol and high-speed diesel (HSD) by Rs26.77 on Friday.

Following the increase, the price of petrol now stands at Rs393.35 and that of HSD at Rs380.19.

The announcement was made in a press release issued by the Petroleum Division. It said the prices were revised for the week starting on April 25.

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More to follow

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• In letter to commission, Justice Afridi warns move will set ‘undesirable and potentially far-reaching precedent’
• Fears it will ‘erode public confidence’ in judiciary’s independence and stability
• Last year, he described transfer of three judges to IHC from different provinces under Article 200 as something to be ‘rejoiced’

ISLAMABAD: Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Yahya Afridi has opposed the scheduled meeting of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) being called to consider the transfer of five judges of the Islamabad High Court (IHC) to different high courts of the country.

Although the CJP had earlier declined to call the meeting of the JCP, he eventually scheduled the session after it was requisitioned by a two-thirds majority of the commission’s members, an informed source privy to the development confided.

The commission is scheduled to meet at 1pm on April 28, during which it may consider the contents of the CJP’s letter to the JCP in which he expressed his reservations as well as deliberate upon the transfer of five serving IHC judges to different provincial high courts.

In his letter, the CJP expressed concern that allowing transfers of sitting IHC judges would set an “undesirable and potentially far-reaching precedent, effectively normalising the treatment of judges as administratively interchangeable or disposable”.

Such an approach, the source stated while citing the CJP’s letter, would “carry serious implications for the institutional integrity of the judiciary”, thus “eroding public confidence” in its independence and stability.

Article 200 of the Constitution empowers the JCP to recommend transfers without the consent of the judges concerned. However, the consent of judges was mandatory before the 27th Constitution Amendment. The amended provision has now vested this authority in the JCP, where decisions are taken by majority vote, whether the CJP agrees or not.

It is believed that the judges under consideration for transfer include IHC’s senior puisne judge Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, Justice Babar Sattar, Justice Arbab Muhammad Tahir, Justice Saman Rafat Imtiaz and Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro.

‘Rejoiced’

In one of his interactions with the media on Feb 3, 2025, the CJP had supported the idea of transferring judges to the IHC, even tho­ugh he acknowledged reservations regarding the seniority principle.

At the time, the CJP described the transfer of three judges to the IHC from different provinces under Article 200 as something to be “rejoiced”, setting a precedent that should be followed in the fut­ure. “The IHC is the symbol of four federating units and not merely a white marble building,” the CJP had observed while sharing his reason why he agreed with the proposal to transfer three judges to the high court. He had also read out a summary stating that the transfer of the judges from different federating units was fully “synchronised with the spirit of federalism as enshrined in the Constitution”.

“It is also in conformity with Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court (IHC) Act 2010… [there is] thoughtful consideration behind the proposal, [which] illustrates the resolve and equitable share to the linguistic diversity of our country and [a] fair chance of representation to all the federating units in the high court of the common capital of the federation i.e. [the] IHC,” the summary stated.

“Rejoice the fact that the IHC now has judges who are Balochi-speaking or Sindhi-speaking,” the CJP had emphasised, adding: “Had we had a judge from the tribal area in Peshawar, I would have asked to bring him to the IHC too.”

In his current letter to the JCP, the CJP is said to have stated that the proposed transfer of sitting judges out of the IHC would “in substance assume a punitive character” [and pave the way for] “an outcome that finds no sanction anywhere in the constitutional scheme governing the superior judiciary”.

“Besides, such transfer is entirely alien to the purpose of Article 200 of the Constitution and runs contrary to the foundational principles of judicial independence and security of tenure,” the CJP stated.

The CJP observed, the requisition for convening the JCP meeting for the purpose of transferring the IHC judges “could not be acceded to by the undersigned”. On June 19 last year, the SC’s Constitutional Bench, constituted under the 26th Constitutional Amendment, had, by a 3-2 majority, ruled that the transfer of three judges from provincial high courts to the IHC was in line with the Constitution.

Five IHC judges, the Karachi Bar Association, the IHC Bar Association and others had challenged the transfer of Chief Justice Sardar Mohammad Sarfraz Dogar, Khadim Hussain Soomro and Muhammad Asif from the Lahore, Sindh and Balochistan high courts, respectively, before the SC.

The controversy revolved around the alteration of the IHC judges’ seniority list after these transfers, as Justice Dogar was made the senior puisne judge, paving the way for his appointment as IHC chief justice after Justice Aamer Farooq’s elevation to the SC.

Published in Dawn, April 24th, 2026

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The foreign ministers of Pakistan and seven other Muslim-majority countries issued a joint statement on Thursday, rejecting any attempts to alter the historic and legal status quo in Jerusalem and its Islamic and Christian holy sites.

The foreign ministers condemned the “repeated violations of the historic and legal status quo at Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian holy sites by Israeli occupation authorities”.

They particularly deplored the continued incursions by Israeli settlers and “extremist ministers into Al Aqsa Mosque/Al Haram Al Sharif under Israeli police protection, as well as the raising of the Israeli flag within its courtyards”, the joint statement citing the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Egypt, Turkiye, Indonesia, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates said.

“The ministers reiterated that these provocative actions at Al Aqsa Mosque/Al Haram Al Sharif, constitute a flagrant violation of international law and international humanitarian law, and represent an unacceptable provocation to Muslims around the world, and a flagrant violation to the sanctity of the holy city,” the statement read.

It added that the foreign ministers reaffirmed their “categorical rejection of any attempts to alter the historic and legal status quo in Jerusalem and its Islamic and Christian holy sites, and stressed on its preservation while recognising the special role of the historic Hashemite custodianship in this regard”.

They reiterated that the “entire area of Al Aqsa Mosque/Al Haram Sharif, which amounts to 144 dunams, is a place of worship exclusively for Muslims, and that the Jerusalem Endowments and Al Aqsa Mosque Affairs Department, affiliated with the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, is the legal entity with exclusive jurisdiction to administer the affairs of the blessed Al Aqsa Mosque/Al Haram Al Sharif and to regulate entry thereto”.

The ministers further condemned the “accelerating illegal settlement activity, including Israel’s decision to approve over 30 new settlements, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law, including United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice”.

They also condemned the continued and escalating settler violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, including recent attacks on Palestinian schools and children, and called for those responsible to be held accountable, the statement said.

It added that the ministers emphasised that Israel had “no sovereignty over the Occupied Palestinian Territory”.

“They categorically rejected any attempts to annex the occupied Palestinian territory or to displace the Palestinian people.

“The Ministers stressed that such actions constitute a deliberate and direct attack on the viability of the Palestinian state and on the implementation of the two-state solution, increase tensions, undermine peace efforts, and hinder ongoing initiatives aimed at de escalation and the restoration of stability,” the statement read.

It said the foreign ministers reiterated their call for the the international community to uphold its legal and moral responsibilities and compel Israel to halt its “dangerous escalation” in the occupied West Bank, and to put an end to its illegal practices.

“The ministers called upon the international community to assume its responsibilities and take clear and decisive steps to halt these violations. They also called on the international community to intensify all regional and international efforts to advance a political solution that achieves a comprehensive peace based on the two-state solution.”

The statement said they further reiterated their “unwavering support” for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, particularly their right to self-determination and to realise the independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The statement came two days after the latest storming at Al Aqsa Mosque by Israeli settlers. The settlers forced their way into the site through the mosque’s Mughrabi Gate, under heavy police protection, according to an Anadolu reporter.

Videos circulating on social media showed occupiers performing Talmudic rituals and prayers aloud, including what is referred to as “epic prostration”, particularly in the eastern area of the compound.

Photos shared online also showed two occupiers raising the Israeli flag inside the compound, with the Dome of the Rock mosque visible behind them.

On April 6, far-right Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir had also stormed the Al Aqsa Mosque compound.

Palestinian news agency Wafa quoted the Islamic Waqf Department in Jerusalem as saying that the minister toured the mosque’s courtyards, entering through the Mughrabi Gate and proceeding to the Chain Gate before returning via the same route, amidst a heavy deployment of occupation police.

“He has stormed the mosque approximately 14 times since assuming his position in 2023, as part of an escalating policy towards the mosque,” the report said at the time.

Later, he again stormed the mosque on April 13 under heavy police deployment.

In March, Israeli police had prevented the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, from entering the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem to celebrate Palm Sunday mass. Later, after widespread backlash, Israel said the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem would regain access to Christianity’s holiest site.

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Navy Secretary John Phelan has been fired, a US official and a person familiar with the matter said on Wednesday, in another wartime shakeup at the Pentagon coming just weeks after Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth ousted the Army’s top general.

The Pentagon announced his departure in a brief statement, saying he was leaving the administration “effective immediately.” But it did not provide a reason or say whether it was his decision to go.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Phelan was dismissed in part because he was moving too slow to implement reforms to speed shipbuilding and because he had fallen out with key Pentagon leadership.

One source cited bad relationships with Hegseth, Hegseth’s deputy, Steve Feinberg, as well as the Navy’s No 2 civilian, Hung Cao, who the Pentagon said will now take over as acting Navy secretary.

The source also cited an ethics investigation into Phelan’s office.

A billionaire seen as having close ties to President Donald Trump, Phelan is the first administration-picked service secretary to be fired since Trump came back into office last year.

His departure fits within a broader context of upheaval at all levels of leadership at the Pentagon under Hegseth’s watch, including the firing last year of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General C Q Brown, as well as the chief of naval operations and Air Force vice chief of staff.

On April 2, Hegseth fired Army Chief of Staff Randy George without citing a reason. Two US officials said the decision was tied to tensions between Hegseth and Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll.

Senator Jack Reed, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, called Phelan’s dismissal “troubling”.

“I am concerned it is yet another example of the instability and dysfunction that have come to define the Department of Defence under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth,” Reed said.

The latest departure comes during a tense ceasefire with Iran, as the US flows more naval assets into the Middle East.

The US military is relying on naval assets to carry out a blockade of Iran, which President Donald Trump is hoping will pressure Tehran to negotiate an end to the conflict on his terms.

The Navy is under intense pressure to expand its fleet. China’s shipbuilding industry now dwarfs the US, which was once a global powerhouse.

Trump’s $1.5 trillion defence budget request for fiscal year 2027 includes over $65 billion to procure 18 warships and 16 support ships made by General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls Industries.

It is part of what the Pentagon is calling the “Golden Fleet” initiative, which officials say is the largest shipbuilding request since 1962.

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LONDON: British Prime Minister Keir Starmer insisted on Wednesday that he would not resign, claiming allegations of misleading MPs over his appointment of a party loyalist as UK envoy to Washington had been “put to bed”.

Starmer, facing pressure to resign, addressed MPs after firing the Foreign Ministry’s most senior official, Olly Robbins, blaming him for failing to disclose Mandelson’s clearance problems.

The premier spoke to lawmakers a day after the foreign ministry’s most senior official, Olly Rob­bins, gave evidence to a parliamentary committee, having been fired by Starmer over the affair last week. Starmer has accused Robbins of failing to tell him about problems that emerged during Mand­elson’s security clearance.

He has repeatedly insisted that, despite previously stating that “all due process” had been followed, he would not have allowed the appointment to proceed if he had known that independent vetting officials had recommended security clearance be denied.

Starmer told MPs that Robbins clearly answered “no” when asked if he had shared the recommendation “with me, number 10 or any other ministers”.

He said this clears all allegations of dishonesty against him, adding that although the opposition claimed it was shared with him, it was not. Mandelson was appointed to the top diplomatic post in December 2024.

The specific risks identified by vetting officials are unknown, but Robbins clarified they are unrelated to Mandelson’s ties with Jeffrey Epstein.

He alleged Downing Street pressured officials to approve the appointment, seemingly ignoring security concerns, with a demanding tone of “get it done”.

Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch questioned Starmer’s decision not to retract the appointment, despite other controversies.

Morgan McSweeney, Starmer’s former top aide who resigned over his role in the crisis, is to appear before lawmakers on Tuesday.

Published in Dawn, April 23rd, 2026

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