MUZAFFARABAD: The Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) government has promulgated the AJK Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026, introducing changes to the electoral law aimed at facilitating refugee voters and extending the scope of political party restrictions in line with laws applicable in Pakistan.
According to the ordinance, which surfaced on Sunday, after approval by acting president Chaudhry Latif Akbar, amendments have been made to the AJK Elections Act, 2020.
Under the amendment to Section 24, the post-1989 refugees from occupied Jammu and Kashmir who have shifted between refugee camps or changed their place of residence within AJK will now be entitled to enrol at their new place of residence and cast their vote accordingly.
Move extends scope of party restrictions in line with laws applicable in Pakistan
The ordinance also empowers the AJK Election Commission to issue necessary directions, prescribe procedures, prepare supplementary electoral rolls, and take any other steps deemed appropriate to implement the provision.
In a separate amendment to Section 126, the ordinance provides that if a political party is banned, dissolved or prohibited under the laws of Pakistan, then such a party, along with its branches, organisational extensions, affiliated entities or regional units acting on its behalf, shall also stand prohibited in AJK.
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said on Sunday that traffic restrictions around Islamabad’s Red Zone and Serena Hotel, which was expected to be the venue for the now cancelled US-Iran talks, had been lifted.
“Traffic restrictions around the Serena Hotel and the Red Zone in Islamabad have been lifted today. I extend my heartfelt thanks to the people of Pakistan — especially the residents of Islamabad and Rawalpindi — for their patience and cooperation.
“Your support enables us to ensure the safety of our guests and to continue our efforts for peace in the region. We remain committed to these goals and are grateful for, and in need of, your prayers and wishes,” Dar posted on X.
The restrictions were placed on April 19, with Red Zone being closed to the public as the federal capital braced to welcome foreign delegations for expected talks between the US and Iran.
Entry of heavy transport had also been suspended in Islamabad, but authorities later relaxed the restriction for vehicles carrying petroleum products, food items and medicines.
Reports from the ground on Sunday said several areas in Rawalpindi and Islamabad had reopened. However, residential and commercial areas around Nur Khan Airbase were reported to have remained closed.
The Metro Bus Service between Rawalpindi and Islamabad also resumed operations; however, its route was limited from Saddar to the Shaheed-i-Millat bus stop.
Electric buses in the twin cities were also plying on their routes on Sunday.
“We started running the metro bus service between Rawalpindi and Islamabad on Sunday morning and electric buses on different routes,” Punjab Mass Transit Authority Operations Manager Wajid Saleem told Dawn.
Meanwhile, streets, link roads, markets and banks around the old airport in Rawalpindi remained closed, causing inconvenience for the residents of Shah Faisal Colony, Khalid Colony, Gulzar-i-Quaid, Fazal Town and other areas.
Imtiaz Ahmed, a resident of Faisal Colony, said localities around Nur Khan Airbase were still closed and there was a shortage of water and food items in his area. “I got drinking water from nearby localities, while there is a dire need for water tankers, as there is no water supply from the Water and Sanitation Agency (Wasa). Wasa is charging monthly bills but fails to supply water to the colony,” he said.
Mohammad Umer, a resident of Gulzar-i-Quaid, said, “Saturday and Sunday were weekly shopping days for families … but they could not go out because of the blockades.”
A senior official of the district administration told Dawn that areas that were still closed were likely to reopen by Monday.
US President Donald Trump reiterated on Sunday that talks with Iran would be held remotely and commended Pakistan, which has been playing a mediatory role between Washington and Tehran, saying that Islamabad would “stay involved” in the process.
The US president’s remarks came during a phone interview with Fox News, where he said: “If they (Iran) want to talk, they can come to us, or they can call us; you know, there is a telephone … If they want they can talk, but we are not sending people to travel 18 hours to meet.”
His remarks come a day after he called off a planned visit of US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and adviser Jared Kushner to travel to Islamabad for a second round of talks with Iran.
The first round of historic direct US-Iran talks was held in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, following a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire on April 8. It had ended without an agreement, but also without a breakdown.
Acknowledging Pakistan’s role in the process, Trump said, “Great respect for Pakistan because they have been terrific, they have really tried. So we are going to do it by telephone. If they (Iran) want, they can call us. But again, they know what has to be in the agreement; very simple, they cannot have a nuclear weapon. Otherwise, there’s no reason to meet.”
Pakistan’s civil and military leadership has been engaged in feverish diplomacy, seeking to bring the US and Iran back to the negotiating table after the first round of talks in Islamabad yielded no result.
The talks had taken place as a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire remained in place. It has now been extended by Trump until Tehran submits a “unified proposal” and “discussions are concluded, one way or the other”.
Meanwhile, the expected second round of negotiations witnessed a delay due to continued friction between the US and Iran, particularly regarding Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the US blockade of Iran’s ports.
Unrestricted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as one of the issues at the core of the impasse between the US and Iran. Another point of contention is Washington’s demand for long-term commitments on Iran’s nuclear programme, including constraints on enrichment and safeguards against weaponisation.
US President Donald Trump’s decision to abruptly cancel a previously confirmed visit by his envoys to Islamabad underscores a defining feature of the current crisis: diplomacy that advances and retreats at the speed of presidential messaging.
Until this latest move, Washington had been sending mixed but cautiously constructive signals. Backchannel contacts and Pakistan’s mediation had raised the possibility of direct engagement in Islamabad, potentially involving Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
Mr Trump’s decision to cancel the trip does not formally end the diplomatic track, but it significantly alters its momentum. Instead of actively pursuing negotiations, the burden now shifts to Tehran, effectively placing the onus on Iran to initiate contact on US terms.
US president’s decision to cancel envoys’ trip does not formally end diplomatic track, but it significantly alters its momentum
For mediators like Pakistan, this is a notable setback. Diplomacy thrives on continuity; abrupt reversals complicate both timing and trust.
‘Erratic and provocative’
Iranian officials have long argued that Mr Trump’s public messaging disrupts diplomacy, a concern reflected in Western media coverage.
The Guardian has described Mr Trump’s “erratic and provocative commentary” as “a major obstacle” to diplomacy, noting that such statements can undermine ongoing engagement. The publication has also warned of a broader “lack of a clear exit strategy”, highlighting uncertainty in US policy direction.
The New York Times has frequently noted that President Trump uses social media as an instrument of policymaking, often announcing or shaping decisions in real time.
The Washington Post has reported that his messaging has at times complicated or contradicted official diplomatic positions, while the BBC has highlighted how such statements can move markets and influence global diplomacy.
Analysts across the Western world have pointed to the growing role of presidential messaging in shaping events in real time, where public statements can advance, complicate, or abruptly halt diplomatic efforts. In this conflict, communication is not commentary. It is action.
Mr Trump’s approach has followed a recurring pattern: escalation, pause, outreach, and sudden withdrawal.
The conflict began with what analysts described as a “shock-and-awe” phase, followed by a shift towards economic pressure and conditional diplomacy. Yet even within short timeframes, the president has moved between optimism and coercion, welcoming diplomatic openings while maintaining military pressure.
The cancellation of the Islamabad trip now reinforces this cycle.
The impact extends beyond diplomacy. Energy markets, highly sensitive to geopolitical signals, have reacted sharply throughout the crisis. Oil prices have surged, rising more than 50 per cent since the conflict began, and remain volatile amid mixed signals about war and peace.
More recently, renewed uncertainty following the cancellation of talks is likely to reinforce market instability, as traders respond not only to developments on the ground but also to shifts in tone.
Across Europe, unease is also expected to deepen. Allies already grappling with disruptions linked to tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have expressed concern about the absence of a predictable US strategy.
Islamabad talks on hold, not over
Despite the setback, diplomacy is not dead. Pakistan’s effort to convene talks remains relevant, and both Washington and Tehran retain incentives to avoid a prolonged conflict. However, the dynamics have shifted.
Any future engagement is now more likely to depend on whether Iran chooses to initiate contact — and whether Washington maintains a consistent position long enough to sustain negotiations.
The core issues remain unchanged: US demands for verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear programme, and Iran’s insistence on sanctions relief and an end to military pressure. Mr Trump’s assertion that “we have all the cards” reflects Washington’s attempt to frame the situation as leverage-driven diplomacy.
Tehran, however, is likely to interpret the cancellation differently — as inconsistency or even hesitation.
Both sides are shaping narratives for domestic and international audiences. In that contest, Mr Trump’s communication style remains both a tool and a risk: it enables rapid pressure, but complicates the credibility of long-term commitments.
What lies ahead
The immediate future is more uncertain than it was just days ago.
The Islamabad talks, once appearing within reach, are now effectively on hold. Whether they are revived will depend on Tehran’s response — and whether Washington sustains a coherent approach.
A narrow path to de-escalation still exists: a limited agreement offering phased concessions on both sides. But that path now appears more fragile.
For now, the conflict remains suspended — between diplomacy and escalation — shaped as much by sudden statements as by deliberate strategy.
US President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump were rushed out of the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner by Secret Service agents on Saturday night after a man armed with a shotgun tried to breach security, officials said.
A man armed with a shotgun fired at a Secret Service agent, an FBI official told Reuters. The agent was hit in an area covered by protective gear and not harmed, the official said.
All federal officials, including Trump, were safe. About an hour after Trump was rushed from the event, he posted on Truth Social that a “shooter had been apprehended.” “Quite an evening in DC, Secret Service and Law Enforcement did a fantastic job,” Trump added.
— Screengrab via TruthSocial
Shortly afterwards, he posted, “The First Lady, plus the Vice President, and all Cabinet members, are in perfect condition.” He said he would be holding a White House press conference on Saturday night.
Anthony Guglielmi, a Secret Service spokesman, said the service was investigating a shooting near the main screening area at the entrance to the event.
After the sound of shots, dinner attendees immediately stopped talking, and people started screaming Get down, get down!” Hundreds of guests dove under the tables as Secret Service officers in combat gear ran into the dining room. Trump and the first lady had bent down behind the dais before being hustled out by Secret Service officers.
Many of the 2,600 attendees took cover while waiters fled to the front of the dining hall.
Hours after an Iranian delegation departed Islamabad, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Saturday spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and said that Pakistan was committed to serving as an “honest and sincere facilitator”.
In a post on the social media platform X, PM Shehbaz said that he had a “warm and constructive” call with the Iranian president on the evolving regional situation.
“I appreciated Iran’s continued engagement, including the high-level delegation to Islamabad led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, whom I had the pleasure of meeting earlier today,” he said.
“I reaffirmed that, with the support of friends and partners, Pakistan remains committed to [serving] as an honest and sincere facilitator — working tirelessly to advance durable peace and lasting stability in the region,” he said.
According to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the phone call lasted 50 minutes, with the two leaders exchanging views on the “current regional situation and ongoing efforts to promote peace and stability in the region”.
Further, the prime minister also welcomed Iran’s decision to send a delegation led by FM Araghchi to Islamabad.
“While sharing with the Iranian president an overview of his recent diplomatic outreach to a number of world leaders, the prime minister emphasised that these interactions had been helpful in building broader consensus in support of sustained dialogue and diplomacy aimed at achieving lasting peace in the war-affected region,” the PMO said.
It further said that the prime minister expressed appreciation for the fruitful discussions by the Iranian leadership with Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Munir during his recent visit to Tehran.
“While reassuring the Iranian president of Pakistan’s firm commitment to regional peace, the prime minister said that Pakistan would continue its sincere and honest endeavours to promote regional peace and security,” the statement said.
It added that Pezeshkian thanked the prime minister, CDF Munir and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar for their “significant contribution to the peace efforts”.
“While expressing Iran’s desire for peace, he also expressed confidence that the fraternal ties between Iran and Pakistan will continue to strengthen and expand in the future,” the statement said.
It added that the prime minister also conveyed his greetings and regards to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei.
“Both leaders agreed to continue their close coordination,” the statement concluded.
The first round of direct talks between the US and Iran was held in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, which ended after more than 20 hours without agreement but kept the diplomatic channel open.
Since then, exchanges have continued indirectly through Pakistan, with both sides calibrating positions while avoiding a formal breakdown.
The ceasefire, originally brokered around April 7 and 8, has been extended without a defined timeline, creating space for diplomacy but also prolonging uncertainty.
OVER most of the past year, Pakistan’s role in US-Iran diplomacy remained quiet, familiar and carefully limited; functioning as a channel passing messages and keeping lines of open when direct contact between two global adversaries was politically difficult.
For the larger part, Islamabad was not setting the agenda, only facilitating communication. That changed at the end of February, when the outbreak of all-out war altered ground realities.
What started as discreet facilitation quickly levelled up into something more ambitious, with Pakistan hosting delegations and publicly positioning itself as a bridge between Washington and Tehran.
On March 24, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Pakistan would “facilitate” dialogue, a formulation that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar echoed a week later at the end of a quadrilateral meeting, when he said Pakistan would “host and facilitate meaningful talks”.
From the UN chief to the Kremlin, Islamabad’s efforts to mediate between the US and Iran have won it universal acclaim. Although experts agree Pakistan is best-positioned for this role, lasting outcomes are not reached overnight and require structured engagement
After the first round in Islamabad earlier this month, that description was altered once again, when Dar said on April 12 that he, along with Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, had “helped mediate several rounds of intense and constructive negotiations”.
The change in language was not incidental, rather, it signalled a willingness to place national credibility behind a process whose outcome remains uncertain, at least for the time being.
Why Islamabad?
Part of the explanation for this lies in geography. Pakistan sits next to Iran and within strategic reach of the Gulf, while maintaining longstanding security ties with the US.
But geography alone does not create a mediator. The shift, in fact, reflects a search for enhanced relevance on the external front, with Islamabad seizing the opportunity to act as a major diplomatic player, rather than a security concern. This is especially prescient given the current global context; where influence is increasingly seen as being tied to crisis management, a la the Board of Peace. Additionally, the move to mediation is also about containing the spill-over of conflict into Pakistan’s own sphere, whether through economic disruption, regional instability or security pressures.
There is also a sense among diplomatic practitioners that Pakistan’s past experience gives it the impetus to attempt such a role.
“We played [in the past] an important role in the release of US hostages from Iran,” former foreign secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani recalls.
Pakistan “at the highest level played an active and positive role in bringing about a ceasefire (during the 2026 war) and bringing the two conflicting parties to the negotiating table”, he adds, arguing that the present effort had already averted wider economic losses.
He also notes that Pakistan has looked after ‘Iranian interests’ in Washington for decades — the Pakistan embassy houses Tehran’s consular presence in the American capital — which, in his view, places it in a better position than many others.
That reading is shared by others. Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi recalls that “Pakistan mediated between Iran and Iraq during Saddam’s time in the 1980s. It didn’t stop the war but the effort was made.”
The former diplomat, who is also executive director of the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) think tank, also cited Pakistan’s role in facilitating contacts between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the context of Yemen, not too long ago. “This history qualified Pakistan to be a mediator.”
The emphasis, however, is on effort rather than outcome.
Others underscore how effective mediation depends less on history and more on credibility in the here and now. Former envoy to UN, US and UK, Maleeha Lodhi, observes that “a decisive factor is the mediator’s neutrality and credibility so that the two parties can have trust in the mediating country”.
That requirement becomes more demanding in an asymmetric conflict, where one side holds significantly greater leverage.
‘Historic baggage’
Experience suggests that mediation works under certain conditions: in the existence of a mutually painful stalemate, a mediator possessing both legitimacy and some degree of leverage, and the process being tightly managed. Where any of these elements are weak, the process tends to drift, and positions of the parties involved in the conflict harden.
The experience of Camp David illustrates this. The US did not simply bring Egypt and Israel together, rather it provided inducements and guarantees that made compromise politically defensible. It must be remembered that agreements have to be sold at home, not just accepted across the table; without that political cover, leaders have little room to manoeuvre.
The same constraint applies to the current US-Iran conflict, where Washington is seeking tangible progress on maritime access and nuclear limits, while Tehran needs relief from pressure and recognition of its security concerns. Therefore, any framework for dialogue that does not address both sets of requirements will not do.
Process management is equally important. The Dayton Accords of 1995 — which ended the Bosnian War — showed how controlling the environment in terms of limiting external influence and forcing sustained engagement can shape outcomes, while at the same time allowing the mediator to reduce space for backtracking.
But that model is harder to replicate today, when negotiators are able to remain in constant contact with their capitals through far more sophisticated communications channels.
During the Islamabad talks, there were real-time consultations by the US delegation, which potentially caused positions to shift. The Iranians would have probably loved to do the same, but they were constrained by concerns over the security of their leadership back home.
Striking a balance
Pakistan’s decision to host the talks reflects an awareness that the venue matters. A controlled setting can reduce public posturing and allow space for exploring options, but the limits are also evident.
While Islamabad could host the talks and probably keep the media at bay, it could not fully insulate them from outside influence. This is where the question of leverage becomes central. Pakistan has access to both sides, which few countries do. But access is not the same as influence.
The US retains global options and coercive tools, while Iran is operating under sanctions and sustained pressure. In such conditions, the risk is that mediation begins to reflect the priorities of the stronger side, and that very perception can in itself erode trust.
One should not forget that in January 1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin hosted the Tashkent talks that ended the 1965 India-Pakistan war, acting as a neutral broker despite Moscow’s clear tilt toward India. That agreement focused on withdrawal to pre-war positions and a mutual ceasefire, reflecting a priority on regional stability rather than a preference for one side over the other.
Ambassador Masood Khan argues that Pakistan is not constrained by history, saying: “Thankfully, Pakistan does not carry any baggage from its previous mediatory roles”.
He described the current effort as “a new chapter in the history of diplomacy”, noting that Islamabad had built regional and international support for its role. He also pointed to the framework of Article 33 of the UN Charter as the appropriate basis for mediation.
Structure is key
Yet even with wider support, the structure of the process remains critical.
The Oslo experience is a reminder that momentum without a framework is fragile and negotiations that defer core disputes without enforcement mechanisms tend to unravel over time. The US-Iran dispute is not limited to a ceasefire and involves sanctions, nuclear limits, maritime access and regional security arrangements. Therefore, without sequencing, verification and guarantees, any pause in fighting risks being temporary.
Pakistan’s own diplomatic record reflects these limits. It has often played a role in opening channels, rather than shaping final outcomes. Its contribution to the US-China thaw in 1971 was facilitative, while in the Geneva process on Afghanistan, it was a stakeholder. In Doha, it influenced access rather than the terms of agreement.
Interestingly, most of the foreign policy experts Dawn spoke to mentioned these examples as instances of mediation, even though they were not, in the strictest sense of the term.
These precedents, nevertheless, help unravel what is at stake in the current effort. Pakistan is experienced in enabling dialogue, but its prowess when it comes in sustaining a structured negotiation over time may be found wanting.
Despite this, Islamabad has won acclaim for its efforts — everyone from the UN chief to the Kremlin and Beijing, as well as regional heads of state and even the leaders of the two warring sides have only praised Pakistan’s role.
Whether the current effort succeeds will depend on how the process is managed. Careful messaging, balanced engagement, and a framework that would allow both sides equal grounds to defend a compromise at home is essential to lasting deal. Without these, it is feared that even sustained dialogue may not produce durable outcomes.
